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Yemen
SHEILA CARAPICO

IN FEBRUARY 2011, Tawakkol Karman stood on a stage outside Sanaa
University. A microphone in one hand and the other clenched defiantly
above her head, reading from a list of demands, she led tens of thousands of cheering, flag-waving demonstrators in calls for peaceful political change. She was to become not so much the leader as the figurehead
ofYemen's uprising. On other days and in other cities, other citizens led
the chants: men and women and sometimes, for effect, little children.
These mass public performances enacted a veritable civic revolution
in a poverty-stricken country where previous activist surges never
produced democratic transitions but nonetheless did shape national
history. Drawing on the Tunisiari and Egyptian inspirations as well as
homegrown protest legacies, in 2011 Yemenis occupied the national
commons as never before. Whether or not their aspirations would be
met, the country's youth-who are the demographic majority-had
animated a public civic renaissance. Women's very public participation
was one powerful signifier of seismic sociocultural change.
Youthful pro-democracy activists, gray-haired socialists, YouTube
videos, gun-toting cowboys, Northern carpetbaggers, mutinous army
officers, Shia insurgents, kids wearing face paint, tear gas canisters,
WikiLeaks cables, performance arts, foreign-born jihadists, dissident
tribal sheikhs, and a female Nobel Peace Prize laureate: Yemen's uprisIOI

ing combined slogans and motifs from the Egyptian and Tunisian revolts
with elements of repression emulating Libya and Syria and quintessentially colloquial practices in a gaudy, fast-paced, multilayered revolutionary theater verging on the macabre. The most important trajectory
was that day after day, with special energy on Sabbath Fridays, in cities
and towns across the land, men, women, and children agitated against
dictatorship and the politics of violence. Whether this popular intifada-wracked by intra-elite street battles and complicated by American operations against the local branch of al-Qaeda-would end in glory
or tragedy, its social, psychological, and political significance was inestimable. Regardless of the near-term outcome, as in Tunisia and Egypt,
the experience of collective contentious mobilization "from below" in
solidarity with fellow Yemenis and other Arabs had been transformative for young women and men. They had tasted the power of social
mobilization.
The 2011 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to two Liberian
women who helped pull their country out of the abyss of cruel and
brutal civil war and to a Yemeni spokesperson for her country's human
rights constituency. Nominated inJanuary 2011 shortly after her release
from temporary detention and honored by the committee in Oslo for
representing the popular outcry for liberty and justice across the whole
Arab region, Tawakkol Karman dedicated her prize to all Arab demonstrators and martyrs during the year's revolutionary upheavals. "I am so
happy," she told the New York Times, "and I give this award to all of the
youth and all of the women across the Arab world, in Egypt, in Tunisia"
(quoted in Cowell, Kasinof, and Nossiter 2orr).
When the prize was announced October 7, Yemen's "peaceful
youth" (shabab al-silmiyya) had been in the streets daily for eight
months demanding an end to a three-decades-old dictatorship. With
their turnout multiplied by their endurance, Yemenis had clocked more
demonstrator-days in 2011 than more populous countries such as Egypt.
They had practiced novel public modes of expression, combining indigenous arts such as oral poetry recitation, local dances, and public prayer
with novel technological applications that allowed them to blog and
post and tweet. They rejoiced and uploaded celebratory messages to the
Internet upon hearing the news from Oslo. Defying the return volley
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of rockets and tear gas, protesters called for an international tribunal to
bring President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his cronies to justice.
The uprising that began in January in "Change Square," Midan alTaghayr, near Sanaa University was part of the broader Arab revolution
yet also organically associated with Yemeni culture and political history.
Yemenis adopted North African slogans, "Irhal" and "Isqat al-nizam,"
calling for the departure of the president and the rest of his regime
(Rosen 2001). As in Egypt, there was advance planning for a first day of
protests, but the outpouring and momentum from below soon surpassed
the wildest dreams of would-be organizers. Bypassing the organized
formal elite partisan opposition of the Joint Meeting Parties, youth
congregated in ever-increasing numbers to air their frustrations. In
contrast with metropolitan Cairo's central Liberation Square-Midan
al-Tahrir-where fantastically photogenic multitudes were filmed
from nearby balconies of high-rise hotels by international television
crews, Yemen's marches, like its twenty-some million inhabitants, were
relatively more dispersed among a half dozen major cities and several
smaller towns. Millions strong, they drew much less worldwide media
attention than any of the other major upheavals of the 'fuab Spring":
those in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria.
Yet via phone, Arabic-language satellite television, and the World
Wide Web they were very much in touch with what was going on
elsewhere in the region. Interestingly, unlike in Egypt where to some
it seemed that Facebook and the Internet sparked the revolution, in
Yemen Facebook membership, blogs, and YouTube posts proliferated
from mere handfuls of elites with friends abroad in late 2010 to major
means of communications a year later. It was a cyberexplosion. Thousands ofYemenis joined Facebook during the spring of 2011, others created Facebook pages, still more blogged in Arabic or English or other
languages, hundreds practiced guerrilla photojournalism. Virtual participants among Yemeni emigrant communities overseas passed images
on, and some were picked up by Al Jazeera or analyzed from abroad.
As in Egypt, however, for all the talk of a digital revolution, mobile
phones were by far the most salient form of technology for domestic
communication, and word of mouth spread news within and between
neighborhoods.
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Discontent in the poorest Arab country had been simmering for
years on a number of fronts and levels. Patronage was rampant (Alley
2010), and restlessness stirred around the president's clear intention to
ordain his son, already commander of the nation's Republican Guard,
as his successor. Added to this were the postponement of parliamentary
elections; widespread unemployment, especially among the youth; deteriorating standards of living for all but the upper echelons of the ruling
kleptocracy; ecological depredations to a formerly self-sufficient farm
economy; a consequentially decimated ecology and acute water shortages; abysmal educational and medical facilities, sanitation, and physical
infrastructure; crude resort to censorship, harassment, arbitrary detention, and brutality against journalists, dissidents, and regime opponents;
and profound, widespread malaise.
By late 2010 regional demonstrations or uprisings had cropped up
in different parts of the country with seemingly different complaints.
Most dramatically, governorates in what had been the South Yemeni
territory known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen until
1990 formed a movement (known simply as al-Hirak) for secession.
Agitators had been marching and staging displays in the Indian Ocean
port city ofAden and outlying provinces such as Hadramawt and Abyan
for several years.
Although Southerners rightly felt particular discrimination, things
were not well either in the former North Yemen, where Saleh had ruled
since the assassination of his predecessor in 1978. There was a more
openly armed rebellion rooted in complicated, sometimes counterintuitive sectarian and tribal frictions around villages and valleys in the far
northern province of Sa'adah, seemingly exacerbated by proximity to
the Saudi border (Weir 1997).
In cities and provinces between these geographical extremes, people
were disheartened by high-level corruption, graft, nepotism, and favoritism toward the president's Hashid tribal confederation, including highranking military officers. Often, resentments were highly localized: as
we will see below, rival tribes and inhabitants of the Red Sea coast and
merchants and farmers from the "middle regions" all expressed particular regional and communal concerns.
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Yet, remarkably, over the course of 2on, protests coalesced around
a national, pro-democracy, reformist consciousness. To grasp this astonishing episode of mass civic engagement, it is useful to review earlier
waves of activism and the ways they constituted national and local public
civic realms. From the mid-twentieth century onward, each generation
enjoyed a moment of civic efflorescence: the independence movement
in the Crown Colony of Aden and the South Arabian Protectorates in
the 1950s and 1960s, self-help community betterment projects primarily in North Yemen in the 1970s and 1980s, and a vibrant if short-lived
democratic opening after unification of the two parts of the country in
the 1990s. The civic outburst of 2on, the fourth such opening, drew on
earlier experiences but also shared many elements with what became
known in English as the Arab Spring.

Activist Surges and Public Spheres
Civil society is usually thought of as a zone ofvoluntarism, philanthropy,
and public-spirited discourse beyond the affective bonds of family,
distinguishable from entrepreneurial ventures and outside the formal
apparatus of the state. Most theories of peaceful democratic transitions
hold that a vibrant civic associational network and a lively public intellectual sphere of civility are the sine qua non for the development of
liberal democracy. It is sometimes argued that formal, modern, liberal,
intellectually informed associations often dubbed NGOs (for "nongovernmental organizations'') are the ne.cessary precondition for meaningful political reform, or, on the other hand, that civil society cannot exist
except under constitutional, elected governments. By these criteria
many scholars and pundits, Arab as well as Western, often doubted
whether it was possible to speak of civil society anywhere in the region,
much less in quaint and colorful but underdeveloped Yemen. Certainly
the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, like other Arab dictatorships,
had worked nonstop to curtail, co-opt, and contain civil society within
government-dominated institutions or ruling-party bureaucracies.
Yet looking at Egypt, Yemen, and other countries' subaltern social
movements even before these uprisings, we had recognized that when
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circumstances demand, civil society can enable communities to cope
with physical or political adversity, to navigate bureaucratic obstacles,
and even to challenge authoritarianism. Moreover, although successful
mass movements had been rare, we knew that in the Arab region as a
whole and in Yemen in particular, when legal avenues for complaint and
lobbying are exhausted and conditions become intolerable, there are
exceptional, take-to-the-streets civic moments of mass engagement,
whether organized or spontaneous (Carapico 2010).
Civic activism is a variable, then, not a cultural constant. It consists not only of formal organizations but also of various ways people
exercise collective agency. Shaped by sociocultural, economic, and
political-legal circumstances as well as trends in the Arab and international arenas, civil society in Yemen has expanded and contracted and
varied in shape and content in radically context-dependent ways during
the past half century or so. Prior to the 2011 upheaval, the older generation recalled three distinct and distinctive expansions of civic activity
in different times, places, and circumstances. Note in advance that
none of them had a democratic outcome. Actually, they all ended with
a kind of dialectical boomerang effect: closure of public civic space by
"states" that drew legitimacy from the same popular energies they subsequently sought to repress. While progress toward democracy or even
modernity was halting and faltering, each time people took matters
into their own hands, they left an indelible legacy on national politics,
governance, and society.
The first great Yemeni civic opening occurred in what were then
Aden Colony and the Protectorates of South Arabia during the late colonial era in the 1950s and 1960s. The South Yemeni independence movement, in its civilian manifestations as well as in the armed resistance,
was part of a larger Third World struggle for national self-determination
and an Arabian flowering of political, artistic, and civic expression,
much of it class based (Halliday 1974). Unionized labor stoppages, mass
street marches, the distribution of political pamphlets and newspapers,
hunger strikes, the founding ofYemen's first feminist organizations, and
other arguably imported actions, especially among the polyglot workers
inAden port, combined with creative political performances drawing on
religious or tribal traditions in small towns in the Hadramawt and Lahj.
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This remarkable populist outburst, culminating under complicated
circumstances in the departure of British administrators from Aden
and points east in late 1967, did not survive the independence era. A
briefThermidor was followed by a reign of terror. As in so many other
countries, from Cuba to Algeria to Vietnam, hard-fought postcolonial
independence enabled a revolutionary ruling party, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), to nationalize and centralize all forms of participation
into national federations for labor, women, journalists, intellectuals, and
other corporate groups. Under the People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen (PDRY), women enjoyed rights unparalleled in the Arabian Peninsula if not the whole Arab world: polygamy was outlawed, for instance.
Other progressive social policies were pursued. Yet postrevolutionary
fervor amalgamated mass mobilization to the party-state project. Civil
society retreated underground or fled into North Yemen. The last vestiges of the populist movement that brought it to power were eviscerated in a bloody two-week shoot-out among the Socialist Party elite in
1986.

The second civic renaissance occurred mostly in North Yemen after
the downfall of the thousand-year-old Zaydi imamate in 1962 and the
establishment of a weak republican government, when communities
undertook their own modernization with only minimal assistance from
the ostensibly central state. Unlike the South, the Republic of Yemen
had no colonial history to speak of and was extraordinarily backward
(Halliday 1974). There were hardly any paved roads, public schools, or
municipal power and water supplies. Combining a forward-looking urge
with native urban management and communal practices including tribal
customs, cities and regions built thousands of kilometers of roads and
hundreds of primary and middle schools, and rigged up scores of water
delivery and electrical power stations. Most of these activities were ad
hoc; committees organized around a project often dissolved after its
completion. On the other hand, in some localities, especially the Ta'izz
region, elections were held for local development boards to manage
these projects.
Ironically, decentralized grassroots community betterment projects
laid the infrastructural ground for the relative centralization of state
power that took place when Ali Abdullah Saleh came to office in the
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late 1970s, as transportation access and educational curricula connected
other urban areas and even remote provinces more tightly to Sanaa.
Roads brought goods, strangers, and officials into the provinces, for
instance, while schools utilized texts from the embryonic Ministry of
Education and taught the national anthem. Ultimately the fledgling military government was able to centralize social capital through bureaucratic controls and to claim credit for every classroom constructed with
local resources. The national confederation oflocal development associations morphed into the Ministry of Local Administration (Carapico
1998). Entirely different in style and substance from the South's struggle
for independence, the services-oriented direct-action "cooperative
movement" also left its mark on Yemeni political history and socioeconomic development.
Yemen's third major civic opening heralded unification between the
PDRY and North Yemen in 1990 according to a deal between Saleh and
the remaining Socialist leaders of the PDRY. Stuck at the very end of
the Cold War, this arrangement coincided with German unification.
Unity introduced a panoply of political parties, including the YSP;
Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC); a conservative Northern
party called al-Isiah, close to the GPC and led by prominent Hashid and
Islamist figures; and several smaller Nasserist, Baathist, and Shia parties.
All had their own newspapers and agendas, and all fielded candidates in
reasonably free and fair elections in 1993. When the two former ruling
parties that still commanded the respective armed forces of the two
Yemens refused to abide by the power-sharing mandate of the elections,
however, armed conflict seemed imminent. The two armies squared of£
The Aden-based leadership of the Socialist Party and former PDRY
army launched a bid for secession.
Intellectual elites and ordinary people swung into action with mass
public conferences in urban and tribal areas alike, with small but significant nationwide peace protests, and with a National Dialogue of
Political Forces that produced a constitution-like "contract of accord"
to resolve the impasse short of armed combat (Carapico 1998). The
forces of peace and reconciliation lost. In the two-month, army-toarmy military campaign that followed, Saleh's forces, buttressed by
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self-declared antisocialist jihadis, conquered the old South and chased
the YSP leaders into exile.
Over the next decade and more, the victorious Saleh administration
gradually tightened the vise on public civic expression. Elections were
increasingly engineered to ensure victory for the president and his party
faithful. Aspiring to but never quite mastering the absolute security control achieved in Syria or Libya, Saleh's administration left some room for
an impotent opposition coalition comprising the unlikely bedfellows of
al-Isiah, the Socialists, the assorted Arab nationalists, and small indigenous parties. Known as the Joint Meeting Parties {]MP), this opposition coalition was able to register a modicum of minority parliamentary
dissent. Popular social forces were nearly; but never entirely; quelled.
Under these circumstances of only a ceremonial facade of democracy; people were still able to claim pieces of the public civic sphere in
quotidian ways independent of state-sponsored spectacles of nationhood. In Yemen one of these is the ubiquitous practice of gathering in
private homes to chew qat and talk politics in the afternoons, as well as
participate in oral recitations of poetry. In the more explicitly public
national sphere, expensive pageants such as the celebratory fanfare
devoted to the bogus reelection of President Saleh were no more constitutive of what it means to be Yemeni than the moral panic surrounding macabre incidents such as a series of murders in the Sanaa morgue
(Wedeen 2008). In other words, shared reactions to extraordinary
events as well as shared everyday practices can constitute the Yemeni
"self" as an explicitly national or even democratic person, and this sense
of national identity can be constituted even in the absence of actualization through state institutions (Wedeen 2008, 15). A fairly vibrant if
distinctly male-dominated public civic sphere survived.
The antiregime protests of 2011-and to some extent, perhaps
counterintuitively; even the pro-Saleh demonstrations staged in the
military reviewing stand near his presidential palace throughout the
year-echoed these precedents in distinct though varied ways. In
particular, major regions and cities drew on local customs in ways that
imagined and expressed national aspirations and the collective will
of "the people." To explain this point it is necessary to map the social

YEMEN

109

geography of the pro-democracy movement. The protests transcended
all the preexisting divisions of North versus South, urban versus tribal,
Sanaa versus the hinterland, Shafa'i Sunni versus Shia Zaydi, uplands
versus lowlands, political party loyalties, and conventional gender roles.

Geographies of Protest
A peaceful intifada had already been in motion since the summer of 2007
in the South, the territory known as the People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen and ruled by the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) from late 1967
to 1990. In 1990, the South unified with the North, already ruled by
Saleh; it attempted secession four years later. During the short civil war,
the president called in assorted tribal militias and ''Afghan Arabs" puritanical Salafis ostensibly returned from the victorious anti-Soviet
jihad in Afghanistan-to assist the regular army under the command
of General Ali Muhsin. A beer factory and civil service administration offices in the Southern capital of Aden were torched and looted.
Eventually the erstwhile Southern leadership fled by boat to Oman, and
Northern military officers and gangs of scalawags installed themselves
as governors, administrators, and landowners. Workers deprived of their
jobs, pensioners denied their benefits, and women stripped of the rights
they had enjoyed under the old Socialist administration seethed under
what they regarded as occupation. Oil revenues from wells on what had
been Southern soil flowed into the coffers of Saleh and his cronies (Day
2008).
After more than a decade of economic collapse and political repression, the youth and some of the old YSP cadres launched al-Birak, a
movement motivated largely by resurgent Southern nationalism {Dahlgren 2orn). It drew on some of the slogans, motifs, and performative
elements of the anticolonial movement in Aden, the cities of the Hadramawt, and other communities. Again these included both Socialist elements and locally distinctive traditions of dance, dress, and dialect. The
movement also depended on human rights organizations and municipal
newspapers established during the opening that followed unification in
the early 1990s. By late 2orn, Saleh and his official media could successfully portray their distress as treasonous irredentist threats to national
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unity reminiscent of the 1994 civil war. And indeed throughout 2011
some citizens flew the flag of the old People's Republic, even as others
joined the nationalist movement to oust the regime in Sanaa.
Whether or not they harbored genuinely separatist ambitions, residents of the former PD RY had good reason to feel they were punitively
targeted and deprived of basic liberties and entitlements. What was
not evident to them until after the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt began
was the extent of popular resentments and yearnings in the rest of the
country.
It turned out that many of the tribulations in the South resonated
in every province of the republic: the grotesque enrichment of regime
cronies at the expense of the multitudes, obscenely bad stewardship of
the commons, the skyrocketing prices of meat, staples, and even clean
water; the lack of jobs for college and high school graduates. Already
by 2005 the American ambassador had noted in a WikiLeaked cable
that riots prompted by the lifting of fuel subsidies had stimulated the
prospects for a revolt, especially-but not only-among the perennially restive tribes of the northeastern provinces of al-Jawf and Marib,
where truckers and pump farmers considered cheap fuel their lifeblood
(Carapico 2011). Grandiose pageants of presidential power, half-truths
in the official media, the indignities of military checkpoints, arbitrary
arrests and imprisonments-these and other daily insults fed popular
alienation, despair, and frustration, most notably among the youth.
While a privileged few cooled off in swimming pools in their luxury
compounds, the water table fell, decimating the farm economy that
remained the livelihood of the rural majority. Farmers and ranchers
facing starvation flocked to the cities, where water supplies and social
services were swamped. Misery became the new normal; millions barely
survived on the equivalent of a dollar or two a day. The economy was in
shambles (Colton 2orn).
The breakthrough came in Sanaa, the capital, a metropolitan area
on the high central plateau whose population had quadrupled during
the previous generation owing to the lures of government jobs, services,
and payoffs. It was now a teaming, sprawling, poorly laid out, still picturesque low-rise city of nearly two million inhabitants, more than half
of whom were under twenty years of age. Its schools, sewage disposal
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system, and water supplies were completely overwhelmed. Nominally
both home and center to the ruling family and its security apparatus,
Sanaa was also most exposed to its excesses and regulations and the
prime site for parades of presidential power.
Early in 2011 Saleh loyalists laid claim to Sanaa's central Midan alTahrir so that it would not follow Cairo's example of becoming a stage
for malcontents. Also the huge presidential, military, and ministerial
complexes remained showplaces for Saleh photographs. Drawing from
the precedents of the 1993-94 antiwar, pro-democracy demonstrations,
therefore, students, faculty, and other activists assembled around the
university campus on the western edge of the old part of Sanaa. They
named the space they claimed Change Square (Midan al-Taghayr).
Proportionately, the occupiers represented the demographic bulge of
fifteen- to thirty-year-olds who had never known another leadership:
university students, graduates, dropouts, and wannabes grasping for
hope for a better future. In Change Square and adjoining spaces, these
"peaceful youth" enlivened the experience with music, dancing, poetry
readings, posters, street art, and collective gestures of defiance, such
as fifty thousand pairs of clasped hands held high. The call to prayer
became a call to civic engagement, and mass prayers became a form of
civil disobedience.
Inspired by Karman, who headed the NGO Women Journalists
Without Chains, women defied a conservative cultural norm about
speaking softly in public. They mocked the president's sleazy innuendo
about an un-Islamic "mixing of the sexes" in Change Square. Almost
all women in Sanaa wear the all-encompassing black sharshaf, which is
a modern veil. At one point many thousands lined up, covered in the
customary black. Some rows wore white baseball caps on top of their
veils. Another group sported red baseball caps. Visually, the effect was
to create a white, black, and red Yemeni flag stretching more than a
kilometer down a wide road in a show of patriotism.
The crowds around Sanaa University swelled as tribesmen - the
ranchers, truckers, and farmers from outlying areas-joined the protests. Many of them pitched tents that eventually grew into a sprawling
encampment snaking through the neighborhood around the university
campus with its own sanitation system, medical services, teach-ins,
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and food and water supplies. On March 18, plainclothes snipers fired
from neighboring rooftops onto Change Square, killing more than fifty
mostly youthful and entirely peaceful protesters. In disbelief, fury, and
sorrow, a record 150,000 marched in Sanaa's biggest "day of rage" so far
(Carapico 2on). An avalanche of top-level and midlevel resignations
from the armed forces, the foreign service, the civil service, and even the
president's General People's Congress followed in protest of the excessive use of force against unarmed civilians. Among the defectors were
General Ali Muhsin, the commander of the First Army Brigade who had
dealt mercilessly with Southern secessionists in 1994, and key leaders
of the president's own Hashid tribal confederation, including scions
of the paramount sheikhship, the al-Ahmar family (for background on
this division, see Phillips 2006). These defections from the president's
inner circle split the regime and would eventually divide the capital city
into pro- and anti-Saleh territory. At the same time, collective rage and
moral panic gradually solidified the protests into a nationwide movement. Sentiments crossed party lines: although they belonged to the
same conservative political party, al-Isiah, Karman and the al-Ahmar
brothers were on very different political wavelengths (for background,
see Yadav 2010).
In provincial cities where hundreds or thousands had attended rallies, multitudes now laid claim to public spaces. In Ta'izz, a bustling
commercial and industrial city of more than half a million people
nestled in the verdant southern mountains of the former North, and in
the picturesque neighboring city oflbb, simmering discontent erupted.
The populous Ta'izz-Ibb area, known as the "middle regions," a once
rich agricultural zone tilled by peasants and sharecroppers, served as
a bridge between the Southern al-Hirak and the revolutionary movement centered in Sanaa. People traveled, telephoned, and tweeted with
family and compatriots in Aden, Hadramawt, Abyan, and other parts
of the former PDRY already in foment. By summer, reporters were
calling Ta'izz-a hub for exiled anti-imperialist Southern forces during
the 1960s and a center of the cooperative movement in the 1970s- the
epicenter of the democratic intifada. The city's relatively educated, cosmopolitan student body choreographed a nearly carnival atmosphere
with music, skits, caricatures, graffiti, banners, and other artistic embel-
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lishments. Photos showed throngs massed in dozens of thousands. As in
Aden and Sanaa, women and girls frequently organized separate marches
and displays to underscore the unarmed, modern character of the revolt.
On October 30, 2ou, for instance, they posted a YouTube video full of
flowers, confetti, balloons, music, and ululating commemorating each
of their martyrs by name and portrait. Meanwhile, perhaps even more
than Sanaa, Ta'izz became a battlefield between pro- and antiregime
security forces.
In Hudayda, the steamy, squalid Red Sea port that is the hub of the
Tihama coastal plain where Afro-Yemenis suffer the country's highest
rates of poverty and political disenfranchisement, youth and parents
also filled their own Freedom Square with banners and chants and insurrectionary graffiti. "Irhal!" they yelled in unison: Go! And, referring to
the deposed Tunisian leader who sought refuge in Saudi Arabia: "Oh,
Ali Abdullah, join Bin Ali in Riyadh!" First they applauded Mubarak's
resignation. Many months later, like their compatriots in the highlands,
they celebrated the demise of Libya's dictator Muammar Qaddafi and
dedicated mass prayers to the martyrs of Syria. New mantras, skits, and
cartoons taunted both the Yemeni and the Syrian dictators: "Come on
Ali, come on Bashar, it's time for you to go!" ran the refrain.
Raucous demonstrations mixed with familiar acts of civil disobedience such as road blockages and commercial stoppages in the wideopen, semiarid, sparsely populated plateaus and mountains north,
northwest, east, and somewhat south of Sanaa, regions analogous to
Texas or Wyoming, the avowed tribal heartland where ranchers, cowboys, truck farmers, and hillbillies carry Kalashnikovs or even bazooka
launchers and perennially harbor deep mistrust of the central government. These demonstrations were especially prevalent in al-Jawf and
Marib governorates, stretches of the north and east populated predominantly by members of the Bakil tribal confederation, the rival to
Hashid. More reminiscent of the 1993-94 mass conferences than of
the familiar low-grade armed resistance, kidnappings, and sabotage,
these protests adopted the si!miyya approach. In al-Baydha, the small
provincial capital of a heavily armed Bakil territory somewhat north of
the former inter-Yemeni border, men who normally do not leave home
without a rifle threw down their guns to march peacefully. This was
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highly significant: in a country known to be awash in personal weapons,
the mass uprising avoided guerrilla warfare or military insurrection. To
repeat: tens of thousands of tribesmen with the means to launch an
armed revolt resisted the temptation to open fire.

Counterrevolutionary Forces
The response to the peaceful protests was wrathful. Divisions loyal to
the president, mostly commanded by immediate members ofhis family,
fired on unarmed demonstrators in Sanaa, Aden, Ta'izz, Hudayda, and
elsewhere. Hundreds of deaths stoked rather than quelled the protests,
however. Grainy, graphic cell phone footage was uploaded to the Internet. In each community, every funeral provoked more angry or griefstricken dissenters to call for the downfall of the regime.
More explosively, loyalists and dissidents engaged one another in
mortal combat, especially in certain neighborhoods ofSanaa. The bloodiest battles pitted Saleh's family commands, including the Republican
Guard and special forces, against the renegade brigade led by General
Ali Muhsin and the Rashid tribal militia headed by the sons of the late
great Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar, who had been part of the Saleh regime
for three decades. In other words, powerful elements of the president's
inner circle representing key military and Hashid constituencies, long
considered his base of support, had turned against him. At various times
Saleh labeled them bloodthirsty, seditious traitors, coup makers, terrorists, and thugs. General Ali Muhsin placed an armed cordon around
the large neighborhood surrounding Change Square to protect the protesters. There were frequent skirmishes around the al-Ahmar family
compound on the airport road. The June explosion inside the mosque
in the presidential palace compound, which left Saleh disfigured while
killing or crippling several of his deputies, was almost certainly some
kind of inside job (Phillips 20u). This was an intraregime squabble. The
"peaceful youth'' emphatically did not line up behind the general or the
sons of the old sheikh, al-Ahmar.
The Saleh regime also repeated a tactic from 1994 in deliberately
unleashing zealous militants, nowadays associated with al-Qaeda,
against dissidents in parts of the old PDRY, especially Abyan and its
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provincial capital, Zinjibar. Not more than a couple hundred fighters,
many of them foreign, took advantage of the precipitous withdrawal
of army and security units to overrun civilian officials in several towns.
This subplot in the overall story of the Yemeni revolution dovetailed
strangely with American counterterrorism operations targeting alQaeda figures inside Yemen, including the U.S.-born Anwar al-Awlaqi
and his son, killed separately in their tribal homeland farther east in
Shabwa province. Close coordination between American and Yemeni
security officers in this field of operations allowed President Saleh to
present himself as a reliable ally for the United States and Saudi Arabia
against militant Islamists.
The hegemon of the Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, played a high-profile
yet rather inscrutable and seemingly ambivalent role, coaxing its longtime ally to sign an agreement to transfer power but failing to press for
a cease-fire. In May, Saudi Arabia and the other oil monarchies in the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), working with the Yemeni opposition
in the Joint Meeting Parties, announced a plan whereby Saleh would
relinquish presidential power in exchange for immunity from prosecu- ·
tion for himself and his family. Saleh stalled and negotiated, three times
promising and then refusing to sign the same document on the grounds,
he said, that it was an invitation to hand power to the mutinous factions
of the military. The United States and other Western powers joined the
GCC in rhetorically supporting this vague agreement (the precise text
of which was never released).
The moment for Saleh's departure from office seemed to come in
June, when he was airlifted to a top-of-the-line hospital in Saudi Arabia
for emergency surgeries and then convalescence following the explosion
inside the presidential compound. It was widely assumed that the Saudi
government, a major donor to Yemen and specifically to the regime,
would be both willing and able to prevent his return (Haykel 2on). In
Saleh's absence, however, his son and nephews took aim at their allies
turned rivals. Military and civilian deaths mounted, electricity and fuel
supplies waned, and life in the cities became even more intolerable.
More than three months later, on September 23, suddenly and somewhat mysteriously, the president returned to Sanaa, still insisting that he
would relinquish power only after his government had organized tran-
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sitional elections. Not entirely unlike the bloodletting that took place
among Socialist leaders in 1986 in Aden, intra-elite gun battles raged in
Sanaa and Ta'izz throughout October and into November.
Yet the international community did not press for a cease-fire or
threaten sanctions against the Saleh regime. As another prominent
female activist, Hooria Mashhour, tweeted on September 21, "We were
expecting a stronger attitude from the GCC countries towards the
crimes committed against the Yemeni people, but we get extremely
disappointed to see the meeting between {Saudi} king Abdullah and
Saleh." A month later, on October 21, the Security Council of the United
Nations issued an ambiguous, toothless resolution condemning human
rights violations by "the government and other actors" and calling for
all sides to commit to a peaceful transition of power in accordance with
the GCC formula. If the reactions were any indication, Resolution
2014 favored the incumbent's position over the protesters' demands.
Yemen's official press agency, Saba, enthused that Saleh "welcomed"
what it phrased as "support for the Presidential decree of 12 September
which is designed to find a political agreement acceptable to all parties,
and to ensure a peaceful and democratic transition of power, including
the holding of early Presidential elections" (Saba News 2on). Writing
for the protesters, Tawakkol Karman (2on) opened an op-ed in the
Guardian on November l with the words "Yemenis are ready to pay the
ultimate price to take on a brutal dictator. Yet the UN can't even bring
itself to condemn him."
With arms raised, multitudes bewailed escalating violence and petitioned the international community to intercede diplomatically. After
a series of attacks on female activists by security forces, urban women
in Sanaa, still wearing their customary sharshaf, staged a particularly
Yemeni form of protest drawing on rural traditions: they set fire to a pile
of old-fashioned bedspread-like veils called makrama, sending a symbolic distress signal to the tribes. Their pamphlets read: "This is a plea
from the free women of Yemen; here we burn our makrama in front of
the world to witness the bloody massacres carried out by the tyrant
Saleh." Marchers in al-Baydha, Ibb, and other cities and towns cried for
Saleh's prosecution in an international court. Demonstrators in Sanaa
and Ta'izz adopted the slogans "Remaining peaceful is our choice" and

YEMEN

II7

"Peaceful, peaceful, no to civil war." "The Yemenis' voice is one," they
shouted in November, "we will bring corrupt Saleh to justice."
At a ceremony on November 23 in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, witnessed by Gulf royalty and Western diplomats, a smiling Saleh finally
affixed his signature to four copies of the so-called GCC deal. There
was no celebration whatsoever, because few Yemenis trusted either the
deal or his signature. The following day, back in the presidential palace,
still acting as head of state, he declared an "amnesty'' for those who had
committed "errors" while vowing to prosecute perpetrators of"crimes"
against his person and his administration. Karman, who was on a worldwide speaking tour, charmed audiences, but the specifics of her message
went unheeded. Blood continued to flow, particularly in the streets of
Ta'izz, while the international community scarcely raised an eyebrow.

Conclusions

The 2011 uprising built on the social capital from earlier civic moments
in Yemeni history: the Third World cries for independence of the nowaging 1960s generation, the cravings for modern services and education
of the 1970s, and the pro-democracy patriotic sentiments of the early
1990s. Just as each of these very different mobilizations left its legacy,
so too would this one. Even should it prove to have been relatively
short-lived, this fourth civic opening had been the widest and the most
inclusive part of an earth-shattering pan-Arab movement for change.
The uprising will have shaped the national civic consciousness of
today's youth for decades to come. The new civic awareness of the
Yemeni public was fed by much more than electoral pageantry or
moral repugnance at murders in the morgue, displays of intraregime
violence and excessive force against demonstrators, or the spuriously
bizarre policies of Yemen's international patrons. Moreover, anyone
who has participated in mass public events-the American civil rights,
antiwar, or Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, for instance, or even
highly competitive football matches in huge stadiums - knows how
electrifying it is to be part of a crowd cheering or booing in unison. The
Nobel Prize that enabled one eloquent and forceful, but rather ordinary;
spokeswoman to appeal to the United Nations and the world for action
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further nurtured patriotic pride and shored up the hopes of protesters
persevering against long odds.
The near-term outcome probably will be neither full-scale revolution nor a smooth transition. Before all this happened, intelligence
analysts considered Yemen unstable and possibly hovering on the edge
of state failure. The next phase might be cruel, messy, or both. The
country could split along North-South lines or other fractures. Communities could resort to armed resistance. Saleh and his sons and nephews
seemed to prefer civil war or anarchy to stepping down; and General
Ali Muhsin, the al-Ahmar brothers, a few other conventional actors,
and small bands of al-Qaeda-type militants had joined in battle. After
the gruesome death of the Libyan dictator heightened public determination for the demise of both Ali Abdullah Saleh and Syria's Bashar
al-Assad, Saleh's gunmen cracked down harder on civilian protesters and
prepared to wage all-out war with military defectors.Jihadist infiltrators
from Saudi Arabia seemed to be provoking conflict in Sa'adah province.
After the American drone strikes that killed the al-Awlaqis, the risk that
either a terrorist attack or counterterrorism operations would ignite
fighting on new fronts could not be discounted. Uncounted dangers lay
on the road ahead, with little sign of diplomatic intervention from the
United Nations, the United States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, or
any other quarters.
Even under the worst-case scenarios, however, there had been a radical change that amounted to a civic _revolution for Yemen and the whole
Arab world. Never in the long history of the Arabian Peninsula had citizens acting as such constituted a body politic and assembled en masse to
insist on political reform. For 2011, at least, Southern malcontents and
rebels in Sa'adah found common national cause with college students
in Sanaa and Ta'izz and with tribesmen from the hinterlands around
ideas about social justice, nonviolence, and better governance. However
divided they were between the more widespread and popular movement
for change and the still not-insignificant minority who turned out for
Saleh rallies, "the people" spoke out and claimed the metaphorical and
physical commons.
Yemen's "peaceful youth" activists raised their voices not only as a
nation but also in unison with revolutionaries elsewhere in the Arab
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world. This was also a substantial development. It was not impossible
in 2010 to imagine Yemen exploding with mass fury, or to foresee a
"take to the streets moment" in Cairo, or to recognize the alienation
ofTunisians from the Ben Ali regime. What could not be foreseen were
the simultaneity, synchronization, and solidarity that arose among
essentially leaderless protests from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian
Ocean and beyond. A virtual Arab/Arabic-language public civic sphere
expanded through cell phones and the Internet as well as through Al
Jazeera and other broadcasters, until customary forms of censorship
and intimidation could not contain the flow of information. It was even
more remarkable that a religious thirty-two-year-old mother of three in
a head scarf from the most remote, poverty-stricken, socially conservative corner of the Arab world would go down in world history as the
embodiment of peaceful pro-democracy agitation in the region. Finally,
by the end of 2on, a variation of the somewhat anarchic, antisystemic
Liberation Square sit-ins and campouts in Arab countries had spread
across the globe as young people from Athens to New York and many
other cities occupied physical and virtual civic spaces in a worldwide
wave of protests. It was quite remarkable that several million young
Yemenis, represented by one young mother, were so much in the vanguard of this global movement for local, national, and worldwide change.
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